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Deeply Contacting the Inner World of Another: 
Practicing Empathy in Values-Based  
Negotiation Role Plays 
Jennifer Gerarda Brown  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Teachers of law are preparing students to be peacemakers—or, at 
least, to facilitate peace by helping clients resolve conflict in 
particular ways. Much of the curriculum in law school focuses on 
resolving or preventing conflict in courts, legislatures, and 
administrative agencies. In dispute resolution classes, we strive to 
broaden students‘ understandings of the mechanisms, models, and 
norms by which they can assist their clients to resolve conflict.  
I have come to believe that if we take this peacemaking business 
seriously, our job as legal educators is not only to teach students the 
doctrine, theory, and practical skills associated with lawyering, but 
also to help our students grow into healthier, happier,
1
 ―better‖ 
human beings. Our job, in other words, can sometimes include 
nurture of their growth not only intellectually, but also socially, 
emotionally, and (dare I say it) morally.
2
  
 
  Carmen Tortora Professor of Law and Director, Center on Dispute Resolution, 
Quinnipiac University School of Law; Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School. I am grateful 
to Michael Bivona, Christina DeLucia, and Amita Patel for helpful research assistance and to 
my father, Theodore Brown, for helpful comments and conversations. Fellow panelists and 
participants in the Scholarship Roundtable at Washington University also provided extremely 
helpful input in the development of this Essay. 
 1. See generally Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of 
an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999).  
 2. Kathy Abrams and Hila Keren have analyzed the ―ambivalent reception‖ that greets 
the growing field of law and emotion. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and 
the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2033 (2010). Abrams and Keren conclude that this 
chilly reception stems from a failure to appreciate the ―pragmatic potential‖ of ―thorough 
interdisciplinary investigation of the emotions‖; such investigation, they argue, can aid in 
―normative thinking about the law: either about its amelioration or about its role in shaping the 
affective lives of its subjects.‖ Id. at 2041; see also Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, Empathy, and 
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Legal educators who focus on students‘ emotional growth have 
strong justifications for their pedagogy. Lawyering is difficult.
3
 The 
practice of law is often taxing intellectually, and lawyers must 
withstand many pressures: the demand for billable hours, complex 
and often narrow specializations, and competition from other lawyers 
(not only in the U.S. but in an increasingly global market for legal 
services). Lawyers must often handle difficult people in difficult 
situations.
4
 Clients, judges, opposing counsel, and sometimes 
members of their own firms or legal teams can make demands that 
require an integrated response, one that combines intellectual rigor 
and precision with emotional sensitivity and accuracy. These 
demands can wear on lawyers in many ways, and those with 
―emotional intelligence‖ complementing their technical legal 
knowledge are often better able to exercise the professional judgment 
that integrates multiple facets of the presenting problems. 
The foundation and most of the structure for students‘ emotional 
health and growth is already laid by the time they enroll in law 
school. Families of origin, friendships and romantic relationships, 
various forms of community engagement, recreational activities, and 
faith communities are likely to exert greater influence on the social 
and emotional lives of law students than a few law professors ever 
could.
5
 Prior experience with individuals, groups, and institutions will 
 
Compassion: Introducing First-Year Students to the “Heart” of Lawyering, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1 
(2008). 
 3. Cf. SCOTT PECK, THE ROAD LESS TRAVELLED 15 (anniv. ed. 2003) (famous first 
sentence: ―Life is difficult‖). Peter Reilly surveys the development of interpersonal skills 
training in legal education, noting that  
[I]n 1955, Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold called upon the bar and the legal 
academy to recognize the need for human relations training in law school. Griswold 
said that such training could help lawyers better understand their own emotional needs 
and that of their clients . . . . 
Peter Reilly, Teaching Law Students How to Feel: Using Negotiations Training to Increase 
Emotional Intelligence, 21 NEGOTIATION J. 301, 308–09 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 4. Reilly, supra note 3, at 309. 
 5. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
385, 391 (1992) (noting disputes about whether ―such basic behaviors as cooperation and caring 
can be learned later in life‖). Coincidentally, just a few days before turning in this draft for the 
roundtable discussion, I received an email from Fred Pryor Seminars promoting a seminar on 
―Developing Emotional Intelligence.‖ See Fred Pryor Seminars, Developing Emotional 
Intelligence, FRED PRYOR SEMINARS AND CAREERTRACK, http://www.pryor.com/mkt_info/ 
seminars/desc/IQ.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).  
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have already determined, to a large extent, whether law students have 
the maturity and perception to process the emotions they or others 
feel.  
But even if our influence is small, reasons abound to explore and 
use it wisely.
6
 What if, in addition to core competencies such as 
writing, statutory interpretation, and case analysis,
7
 we also 
developed a sense of core emotional competencies and set out, 
intentionally and thoughtfully, to teach those?
8
 Peter Reilly has 
argued that Negotiation courses particularly ―allow students the 
opportunity not only to analyze, but also to experience and feel (and 
perhaps even fuse into their own personalities and constitutions) the 
principles, theories, and concepts of negotiations, thereby training the 
students in understanding emotion and increasing their emotional 
intelligence.‖9 He therefore presents a ―gentle plea‖ for law schools 
 
 6. Dispute resolution classes, particularly, can give students the chance to integrate their 
emotional and social foundation with the skills, practices, theories, and new values that they 
acquire in law school. In my experience, all of these classes give rise to such conversational 
opportunities: Professional Responsibility, Negotiation, Mediation, and Dispute Resolution 
survey courses. I‘m sure that my personal experience does not exhaust the list of courses in 
which this training is possible. Teachers of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Client Counseling and 
Interviewing, Clinics, and Externship Seminars (back at school; not necessarily on site with the 
externship supervisor) suggest that these courses also provide similar opportunities for 
integrative conversation. 
 7. Prawfsblawg summarizes a key point of the Carnegie Report this way: ―Lawyers are 
best taught through a curriculum that integrates the three pillars of doctrine, skills, and 
professional identity, rather than having a curriculum that focuses on doctrine, and treats the 
other pillars as ‗add ons.‘‖ Jason Solomon, What Did the Carnegie Report Say Anyway?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 27, 2009, 3:38 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/ 
09/what-did-the-carnegie-report-say-anyway.html. 
 8. I am not the only one asking this question. Even as this Scholarship Roundtable met in 
St. Louis, Susan Daicoff held a call-in ―Topic Meeting‖ in which she discussed ―the soft skills 
of lawyering.‖ Susan Daicoff, (S)Killing Me Softly: Unifying the “Soft Skills” of Law Practice 
and Legal Education (Synthesizing Leadership, Collaboration, Professionalism, Emotional 
Intelligence, Conflict Resolution, Problem Solving, and Comprehensive Lawyering), SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming). In the abstract for this talk Daicoff says that ―[a] reevaluation of 
the competencies needed to be a 21st century lawyer, thus seems appropriate. Some even assert 
that it is time to decisively redefine both the role of the lawyer and the content of legal 
education.‖ Id. Daicoff continues: ―Despite resistance to training in the ‗soft skills‘ of law 
practice, such as human relations skills, there is empirical evidence that the soft skills of law 
practice are precisely those skills that differentiate the most successful lawyers from the rest of 
the pack.‖ Id.; see also WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF 
LAW: SUMMARY 6 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY]. 
 9. Reilly, supra note 3, at 302.  
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to ―make training in emotions, whether as part of a negotiations 
course or as a stand-alone course, a curriculum staple.‖10 I agree with 
Professor Reilly about the importance of emotions and the potential 
that Negotiation courses hold as a site for training in this area.
11
 This 
Essay extends his thesis to discuss the relationship between 
negotiation pedagogy
12
 and a particular aspect of emotional 
intelligence—empathy.  
Theorists and practitioners seem to agree about the importance of 
this elemental—if somewhat elusive—competency. Yet, whether and 
how we can teach empathy continues to puzzle us. This Essay 
suggests one potentially fruitful tool for nurturing empathy: a series 
of role plays that Lawrence Susskind and I developed with David 
Kovick and Kate Harvey. These role plays, Williams v. Northville, 
Ellis v. MacroB, and Springfield OutFest, involve values-based 
disputes (―VBDs‖) in which individuals with deep convictions and 
religious faith essential to their core identities find themselves in 
conflict with institutions perceived to be hostile to their beliefs, 
conflicting specifically about a policy or norm that guarantees LGBT 
equality.
13
 These role plays convey important lessons about focusing 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. My thesis is both narrower and broader than Professor Reilly‘s. I am focused more 
narrowly because I will discuss empathy specifically versus emotional intelligence generally. 
But this Essay also seeks to extend or elaborate upon Professor Reilly‘s work because while he 
promoted negotiation training generally for its potential to increase students‘ ability to perceive, 
name, and channel emotion, I describe a specific intervention or type of role playing in which a 
particular emotional experience may be available to students. See id. at 303 (citing ROBERT K. 
COOPER & AYMAN SAWAF, EXECUTIVE EQ: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND 
ORGANIZATIONS xiii (1998)).  
 12. Throughout this Essay, I discuss empathy in both negotiation and mediation contexts, 
and make few efforts to distinguish the two processes. While it is true that the presence of a 
mediator often makes a big difference (as, for example, when the mediator models empathy for 
the parties or leads the parties in exercises that help to develop and demonstrate the parties‘ 
empathy for each other), the basic nature of empathy in the two contexts remains unchanged. 
Furthermore, because many teachers of negotiation use mediation role plays to convey specific 
lessons, I am focusing on three specific mediation role plays as potential vehicles for teaching 
empathy. It may also be possible to run these exercises without a mediator participant if a 
negotiation teacher wanted to maintain a strictly dyadic structure in simulations. 
 13. See generally app. 1 for a brief description of the characters and situations included in 
each role play. The role plays are based on three cases actually litigated in federal courts. I have 
used the three cases to illustrate the potential for mediation to help resolve these apparent 
clashes between ―religious liberty‖ and ―gay rights.‖ See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, 
Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights and Religious Liberty, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
747 (2010).  
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on values and identity, in addition to interests, in order to resolve 
even these deep, value-based disputes.
14
 
This Essay adds some thoughts about the way values-based 
dispute simulations offer students a powerful opportunity to practice 
empathy. This practice comes simply in playing a character who is 
fully and sensitively drawn to be dramatically different from the 
student. In order to play the character with any kind of competence, 
the student must empathize with the character, must enter into his or 
her world view, and must respond to others‘ behavior as the character 
would. 
At the end of this Essay, I share some reflections from students 
who have participated in such role plays. For now, however, let‘s 
consider one, because it vividly conveys the sort of experience that 
values-based role plays can provide in practicing empathy, especially 
for the students assigned to play characters very different from 
themselves: 
What I generally remember thinking at the beginning was that 
while I am neither a mom, nor a religious person, nor someone 
who opposes recognizing same sex families, I could identify 
with the character's desire for parenting autonomy, and with 
her belief that she should be free to raise her kids according to 
her own values. When we started the role play, I noticed 
myself actually feeling resentful—hostile, even—toward the 
―administrators‖ who seemed convinced that their own 
worldview was the only correct one. As the exercise went on, 
it was easy to imagine how parents in this position would feel 
marginalized and upset that they were being treated or viewed 
like bigots when (in their minds, at least) they only wanted the 
freedom to control their kids‘ exposure to issues of genuine 
cultural controversy. I stopped seeing the character 
as backward and cranky, and instead felt some sympathy with 
 
 14. These lessons are thoughtfully explored in an excellent teaching note prepared by 
Professor Susskind and a group of his students. See Lawrence Susskind et al., Teaching about 
the Mediation of Values-Based and Identity-Based Disputes: Teaching Notes to Accompany 
Three Role-Play Simulations: Ellis v. MacroB, Springfield Outfest, and Williams v. Northville, 
available at http://www.pon.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
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her desire to live in a more pluralistic society, where no one is 
forcing their values on anyone else.
15
 
This student recently said that even a year after participating in the 
role play, ―I still tell folks about the experience and how eye-opening 
it was.‖16 I believe it was stepping into the shoes of this ―other‖ and, 
as Carrie Menkel-Meadow has put it, ―taking the other person‘s 
feet‖17 that so dramatically impacted this student. The purpose of this 
Essay is to theorize a bit about why experiencing the ―other‖ in this 
way should be so powerful, and then modestly propose one specific 
intervention to create such learning experiences. 
This Essay proceeds in several steps. Part II surveys a small piece 
of the prior wisdom about empathy, working through the sometimes 
confusing vocabulary to make clear the specific emotional 
phenomenon on which this Essay focuses. With some clearer picture 
in mind about the meaning of ―empathy‖ for purposes of this 
discussion, Part III reviews some of the ways teachers, trainers, and 
practitioners
18
 of dispute resolution have proposed to teach empathy 
in its various forms. Part IV focuses on simulation, describing several 
popular role plays that are touted vehicles for teaching empathy. I 
also discuss some recent critique of role plays as negotiation 
pedagogy. Part V focuses the discussion still more narrowly on the 
values-based role plays described above, the specific process that can 
occur when a student enters into role fully in these simulations, and 
the pedagogical payoff of such role plays for teaching empathy. 
II. EMPATHY: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE CARE 
Writers in dispute resolution have attempted to capture this 
elusive concept in various ways. Sometimes, the same word—
empathy—is used to talk about different things (cognitive 
 
 15. E-mail from Student ―Mrs. Williams‖ to Jennifer Gerarda Brown (on file with author). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 389. 
 18. I include practitioners on the theory that some approaches to mediation understand the 
mediator‘s role to include assisting the parties in developing and communicating an empathic 
understanding of each other. See id. at 416 (describing ―‗conceptual turn taking,‘ role-playing, 
and the kind of interacting that occurs in legal mediation, all of which are structured learning 
experiences that enable us to see the position of the other‖). 
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understanding vs. emotional connection and resonance). At other 
times, referring to what may be the same phenomenon, we use 
different words (―empathy‖ vs. ―recognition‖). This Part surveys 
some of the literature related to empathy, not only to observe the 
numerous and subtle ways that scholars have explored empathy, but 
also to gain clarity about the specific understanding of empathy that 
can enhance students‘ emotional intelligence. I argue that in addition 
to cognitive, analytical forms of empathy, lawyers sometimes need 
affective empathy—an ability to enter into and resonate with the 
emotional reality of another. 
The literature reflects two views of empathy, one cognitive and 
the other affective. As Kimberly Rogers and coauthors explain: 
Empathy broadly refers to our reaction to the observed 
experiences of others. Previous investigators and theorists have 
taken two main approaches to the study of empathy. The first 
approach emphasizes ―cognitive empathy,‖ which can be 
defined as the process of understanding another person‘s 
perspective. The second approach emphasizes ―affective 
empathy,‖ defined as an observer‘s emotional response to the 
affective state of others. Recently, researchers have adopted a 
more multi-dimensional approach, acknowledging that both 
components are an integral part of empathy. This approach 
views the cognitive and affective components of empathy as 
two separate, but related constructs.
19
 
Although cognitive empathy holds greater sway among scholars who 
write about empathy in legal disputes, I want to suggest that for 
training purposes, we should give students opportunities to practice 
affective empathy as well. 
Affective empathy is an important piece of legal negotiation 
training for (at least) two reasons. First, the lawyer/client relationship 
can be strengthened when clients know that their lawyers not only 
understand the clients‘ positions and interests, but also resonate with 
the clients‘ feelings about the conflicts in which they are embroiled.20 
 
 19. Kimberley Rogers et al., Who Cares? Revisiting Empathy in Asperger Syndrome, 37 J. 
AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 709, 709 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 20. See Gerdy, supra note 2, at 7 (finding that surveyed clients place value on knowing 
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The client is likely to trust a lawyer who seems to be on her side, and 
that trust will open lines of communication essential to competent, 
problem-solving representation. Some measure of affective empathy, 
then, facilitates compassionate and effective lawyer-client 
relationships.  
Second, and possibly more tentatively, I want to suggest that 
when people feel under siege, and when their deepest values and 
identities are at stake, resolution of related conflicts may become 
more possible when those people under siege feel not just 
understood, but affirmed in some small way. Even if individuals and 
the lawyers who represent them must ultimately reject or put aside 
the world view that animates opponents‘ positions in conflict, 
chances for resolution—for lasting peace—may increase if the 
opponents know that the other side has been willing to enter their 
world, see their perspective, and feel how important the issues are 
from that perspective. Some measure of affective empathy thus 
facilitates a lawyer‘s ability to resolve conflict with third parties.21 
How then should we understand affective empathy? This 
―deeper‖22 sense of empathy emerges from the psychotherapeutic 
literature, and is what Judith Jordan describes when she writes that 
―[e]mpathy involves the capacity to perceive another‘s affective state, 
to resonate with that emotional state, and to gain some understanding 
or clarity about the other‘s subjective world.‖23 When we empathize 
with another, we allow ourselves to enter into a ―sustained . . . 
immersing . . . in the experience of the other‖ so that ―[a] genuine 
meeting of persons can occur.‖24 Leslie Greenberg and Robert Elliott 
write that ―[e]mpathy involves listening from the inside as if ‗I am the 
other,‘ as opposed to occupying an outside vantage point.‖25 In this 
 
that their lawyers care about them). 
 21. See Susskind et al., supra note 14, at 8 (noting a distinction between ―cognitive 
understanding‖ and ―empathic understanding‖). 
 22. Depth functions as a metaphor, here, since it‘s not at all clear that emotions are deeper 
than thoughts. 
 23. Judith v. Jordan, Relational Development Through Mutual Empathy, in EMPATHY 
RECONSIDERED: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 343, 344 (Arthur C. Bohart & Leslie S. 
Greenberg eds., 1997) (emphasis added). 
 24. Arthur C. Bohart & Leslie S. Greenberg, Empathy and Psychotherapy: An 
Introductory Overview, in EMPATHY RECONSIDERED, supra note 23, at 3, 5. 
 25. Leslie S. Greenberg & Robert Elliott, Varieties of Empathic Responding, in EMPATHY 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/7
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way, ―[e]mpathy is the process of deeply contacting the inner world 
of another, being attuned to the nuances of feeling and meaning as 
well as the essence of another‘s current experience.‖26 This ―more or 
less immediate apprehension of [another‘s] subjective world 
[requires] imaginative entry into the experience of the other.‖27 In this 
view, Greenberg and Elliott argue, empathy is ―an affective form of 
understanding,‖ something one ―feels rather than just understands 
intellectually;‖ thus empathy ―does not depend on labored reasoning 
and differs from conceptual understanding.‖28 It is this understanding 
of empathy that Habib Chamoun and Randy Hazlett seem to adopt 
when they write about ―mutual empathy, . . . ‗the experience of being 
known and accepted deeply by another, being aware of another being 
aware of you . . . among the most psychologically important human 
experiences.‘‖29 
When we leave the realm of psychotherapy
30
 and enter the world 
of legal dispute resolution, however, many writers shift away from 
understanding empathy as an affective process and establish a more 
analytical, cognitive function for empathy. Robert Mnookin, Scott 
Peppet, and Andrew Tulumello express this shift neatly: ―[T]he best 
negotiators also have the capacity to demonstrate their understanding 
of the other side‘s needs, interests, and perspectives—what we mean 
 
RECONSIDERED, supra note 23, at 167, 167–68 (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. at 168–69. 
 28. Id. at 169. But when it comes to the verbal communication of empathy, Greenberg and 
Elliott start to echo Friedman and Himmelstein, as well as Mnookinian analyses: ―At the core of 
empathic communication is communicated accurate understanding.‖ Id. at 175. But simply 
trying seems to go a long way: ―[I]n many instances clients are quite satisfied simply with the 
sense that their therapist is trying to understand.‖ Id. 
 29. Habib Chamoun & Randy Hazlett, The Psychology of Giving and Its Effect on 
Negotiation, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND 
CULTURE 151, 152–53 (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe De Palo eds., 2009) 
(quoting Maureen O‘Hara, Relational Empathy: Beyond Modernist Egocentrism to Postmodern 
Holistic Contextualism, in EMPATHY RECONSIDERED, supra note 23, at 295, 314). 
 30. I should add that the therapist‘s office is not the only place where this view of 
empathy holds sway. The affective account of empathy seems to comport with lay 
understandings of the word. If wiki materials are any indication, the wisdom of the crowd is 
that empathy involves the ―ability to co-experience and relate to the thoughts, emotions, or 
experience of another.‖ Empathy vs Sympathy, DIFFEN, http://www.diffen.com/difference/ 
Empathy_vs_Sympathy (last modified Feb. 14, 2012) (Diffen is an open, public, wiki site 
created and edited specifically to compare and contrast things). 
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by empathy.‖31 In the Mnookinian32 view, ―[e]mpathy does not 
require people to have sympathy for another‘s plight—to ‗feel their 
pain.‘ . . . Instead, we see empathy as a ‗value-neutral mode of 
observation,‘ a journey in which you explore and describe another‘s 
perceptual world without commitment.‖33 This cooler understanding 
of empathy could be interchangeable with ―theory of mind,‖ another 
term used to describe ―the ability to understand the feelings, 
intentions, and motivations of others.‖34  
Another concept closely related to cognitive empathy is 
―perspective-taking.‖ ―Perspective taking assumes that individuals 
perceive the world from differing vantage points, and that because 
the experiences of each individual are to some degree dependent on 
his or her vantage point, messages must be formulated with this 
perspective in mind.‖35 In other words, a party engaged in perspective 
taking ―communicate[s] a desire to understand accurately‖ in part by 
acknowledging that the world may look different to another person.
36
 
Like cognitive empathy, perspective taking facilitates communication 
and improves the quality and creativity of problem-solving.
37
 And 
like empathy more generally, perspective taking requires some 
imagination. Robert M. Krauss and Ezequiel Morsella quote Roger 
Brown‘s succinct summary: ―Effective coding requires that the point 
of view of the auditor be realistically imagined.‖38 In order to express 
oneself effectively, in other words, one must imagine how the listener 
will react to what is being said, so that even as a person speaks, she 
 
 31. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN 
DEALS AND DISPUTES 10 (2000). 
 32. If I am the first to coin the adjectival ―Mnookinian,‖ I would like to suggest with all 
due modesty that this verbal innovation alone renders my paper a valuable contribution to the 
negotiation literature. I said all ―due‖ modesty. 
 33. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 47. 
 34. Rogers et al., supra note 19, at 710 (noting the confusion that has arisen from the 
similarity between cognitive notions of empathy and theory of mind). 
 35. Robert M. Krauss & Ezequiel Morsella, Communication and Conflict, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 131, 137 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 1st 
ed. 2000). 
 36. David W. Johnson, Roger T. Johnson & Dean Tjosvold, Constructive Controversy: 
The Value of Intellectual Opposition, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra 
note 35, at 65, 71–72. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Krauss & Morsella, supra note 35, at 137 (quoting ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 242 (1965)). 
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listens to herself with the ears of another. Perspective taking is not 
automatic, however, and negotiators face significant barriers to this 
essential human capability, a problem to which we will return 
below.
39
 
Like Mnookin and his co-authors, Friedman & Himmelstein 
articulate a cognitive view of empathy.
40
 Enhancing the parties‘ 
understanding of their conflict and of each other is central to the 
mediation process; exploring feelings and making emotional 
connections—while important—is less crucial.41 So, when discussing 
the extent to which a mediation will explore deeper levels of 
meaning, Friedman and Himmelstein write:  
 Whether this level of meaning will be explored is a function 
of three different questions: First, is the mediator personally 
open to this level of strong feeling, pain, fear, disappointment, 
hope, or longing that can accompany this deeper exploration? 
Second, are the parties capable of and willing to entertain this 
kind of conversation and the feelings that may come up? The 
very depth and strength of the conflict itself often pressures the 
parties to go to this level. Finally, does the atmosphere in the 
room feel safe enough for the parties to engage in this quality 
of inquiry?
42
 
That such deeper exploration remains an option—only a possibility, 
and not essential—suggests the ways that Friedman and Himmelstein 
have conceived ―understanding‖ to be a key to dispute resolution 
ingredient that can flexibly operate at various levels of emotional 
intensity. As they make clear, although it may be helpful, ―[i]t is not 
indispensable to a successful mediation for the parties to understand 
 
 39. See infra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 40. See GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIATION 
THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008). 
 41. Id.; see also Chris Guthrie, I’m Curious: Can We Teach Curiosity?, in RETHINKING 
NEGOTIATION TEACHING, supra note 29, at 63 (―Good negotiators must understand their 
counterparts‘ perspectives, interests, and arguments to do well at the bargaining table.‖); ROGER 
FISHER & WILLIAM URY WITH BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES 25 (Penguin Books 3d ed. 
2011) (1981) (―The ability to see the situation as the other side sees it . . . is one of the most 
important skills a negotiator can possess.‖). 
 42. FRIEDMAN & HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 40, at 132. 
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each other at an emotional as well as a cognitive level.‖43 I should not 
overstate the cognitive nature of ―understanding‖ in their view, 
however, since they frequently advise that listening ―has an inner 
life‖ and must occur ―from the heart‖ and ―from the [i]nside [o]ut.‖44 
Friedman and Himmelstein‘s approach to mediation is steadfastly 
focused on ―the inner world of conflict.‖45 
Morton Deutsch similarly bridges the divide between affective 
and cognitive definitions of empathy, as he considers the multiple 
levels at which empathy might operate—levels that implicate both 
analytic and emotional processes: ―(1) knowing what the other is 
feeling; (2) feeling in some measure what the other is feeling; (3) 
understanding why the other is feeling the way she does, including 
what she wants or fears; and (4) understanding her perspective and 
frame of reference as well as her world.‖46  
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, too, has articulated an integrated view of 
empathy, one that stresses the ―feeling‖ aspect without sacrificing 
analysis.
47
 Her work on altruism and lawyering focuses on action 
(altruism), but consistently acknowledges its relationship to feelings 
(empathy).
48
 Menkel-Meadow explains: 
Empathy is a form of understanding that includes both 
cognitive and affective bases of knowing but does not 
necessarily give rise to acts or behaviors. . . . In empathy, as 
distinguished from sympathy, we come to understand the 
situation of the other by experiencing her emotion and 
understanding her experience from her perspective, usually 
achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the other 
 
 43. Id. at 112. 
 44. Id. at 70. 
 45. Id. at xxi. 
 46. Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
supra note 35, at 41, 58. 
 47. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 389. 
 48. Id. Menkel-Meadow says that ―altruism is the action component of empathetic fellow-
feeling.‖ Id. at 413. The relationship is not always causal, however; she also notes that pro-
social acts may occur in the absence of fellow-feeling, and care does not always lead to 
altruistic action. Id. at 390. 
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(colloquially known as ―standing in the shoes‖ of the other, to 
which I would add, by taking the other person‘s feet).49 
Menkel-Meadow thus establishes some key components of empathy 
for our purposes: it involves feeling as well as understanding, it 
requires imagination, and it puts the empathizing person ―in the 
position of the other.‖50 Menkel-Meadow outlines a three-stage 
process for empathy: ―perception or apprehending the situation of the 
other; cognition or understanding the meanings of the situation of the 
other; and affect or feeling the emotional content of the other‘s 
experience, from her perspective.‖51  
In a closely related concept, ―recognition,‖ one might read Robert 
A. Baruch Bush and Jay Folger‘s work as staking out some middle 
ground between the intensely emotional work of therapeutic, 
affective empathy and the more analytic nature of cognitive empathy. 
Recognition, they write, is ―the evocation in individuals of 
acknowledgement, understanding, or empathy for the situation and 
the views of the other.‖52 As Bush and Folger explain: 
The field has (again, to some extent) used this dimension of the 
process to help individuals activate their inherent capacity for 
understanding the problems of others. Mediation has thus 
engendered, even between parties who start out as fierce 
adversaries, acknowledgment and concern for each other as 
fellow human beings. This has been called the recognition 
dimension of the mediation process.
53
 
Some aspects of recognition echo the key qualities of empathy for 
our purposes. ―Genuine appreciation of the other‘s human 
predicament‖54 permits a party to ―consciously [let] go of his own 
viewpoint‖ in order to ―see things from the other party‘s 
perspective.‖55 Bush and Folger elaborate:  
 
 49. Id. at 389. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: 
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 22 (1994). 
 53. Id. at 20. 
 54. Id. at 89. 
 55. Id. at 90. 
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The hallmark of a recognition shift is letting go—however 
briefly or partially—of one‘s focus on self and becoming 
interested in the perspective of the other party as such, 
concerned about the situation of the other as a fellow human 
being, not as an instrument for fulfilling one‘s own needs.56 
Whatever the depth of a person‘s empathic experience, what seems 
clear is that empathy requires imagination as well as perception. Even 
when we ask questions, listen carefully, and gather as much 
information from others as we can—both about how the world looks 
to them and how they feel about what they see—at some point we 
must take a leap of faith. We make an imaginative guess and attend to 
the feelings that our guess elicits in ourselves. In the words of Morton 
Deutsch, ―[e]mpathic concern allows you to sympathetically imagine 
how someone else feels and put yourself in his or her place.‖57 
Many scholars and teachers of dispute resolution have recognized 
the importance of imparting lessons of empathy in order to enhance 
students‘ effectiveness as counselors and negotiators. Menkel-
Meadow, for example, begins with the lawyer-client relationship. She 
posits that lawyers who can empathize with their clients‘ situations 
might arrive at better decisions, and with more consideration for the 
clients‘ needs.58 
As we move from the attorney-client relationship into disputes 
with other parties, the importance of empathy is well accepted. 
Among its benefits, commentators have noted that empathy: 
 ―opens channels of cooperativeness and willingness to 
explore different options;‖59 
 ―enhanc[es] the creativity of the parties and the willingness 
to listen to what either party has to say in a negotiation;‖60  
 
 56. Id. at 20. 
 57. Deutsch, supra note 46, at 57. 
 58. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 411. 
 59. Chamoun & Hazlett, supra note 29, at 152. 
 60. Id. 
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 reduces attribution of negative outcomes to others‘ 
characters or intentions rather than circumstances beyond 
their control (fundamental attribution error);
61
 and 
 increases problem-solving while reducing retaliation.62 
Empathy seems to be an ―apple pie‖ proposition—only in rare cases 
do we find it problematic,
63
 provided it is tempered with a clear sense 
of one‘s own interests and goals.64 The controversy centers instead on 
whether empathy can be learned (and correspondingly, taught), and if 
so, whether and how we can create opportunities for such learning 
and teaching in dispute resolution courses. Thus, Part III considers 
some ways that dispute resolution scholars and practitioners have 
suggested that empathy—whether cognitive or affective—might be 
taught. 
III. TEACHING EMPATHY: CURIOSITY, IMAGINATION, AND IDENTITY 
Before a student can experience empathy, some degree of 
emotional intelligence is required. The student must have ―emotional 
perception,‖ an aspect of emotional intelligence that Peter Reilly 
describes as ―registering, deciphering, and attending to emotional 
messages as they are expressed in facial expressions and voice 
tone.‖65 An emotionally perceptive person can ―(1) identify emotions 
in [him]self; (2) identify emotions in other people; (3) express 
 
 61. Keith G. Allred, Anger and Retaliation in Conflict: The Role of Attribution, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 35, at 236, 250 (citing Dennis T. Regan & 
Judith Totten, Empathy and Attribution: Turning Observers into Actors, 32 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 850 (1975)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. I‘m thinking here about cases of extreme violence, violation, and degradation; to ask a 
victim to empathize with the perpetrator of such crimes might aggravate the injury. On the other 
hand, even in these cases, some victims of atrocity have found the choice to understand and 
even forgive the perpetrator an empowering one. Thus, to note that empathy may be 
―problematic‖ is not to say that it is off-limits for discussion in those cases. 
 64. See FRIEDMAN & HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 40, at 55–57 (highlighting autonomy as a 
value in mediation; parties should not be so overcome with understanding the other side‘s story 
that they lose ownership of their own); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 409 (―Sharing in 
‗fellow feeling‘ might not be appropriate in cases where there is genuine moral opprobrium for 
the other side. Some criminal, civil rights, and environmental cases come to mind, where the 
adversariness and otherness is real and the two sides are morally opposed.‖). 
 65. Reilly, supra note 3, at 303. 
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emotions accurately; and (4) discriminate between real and phony 
emotional expressions.‖66 Reilly suggests emotional training for law 
students to increase sensitivity to ―the subtle signs of emotions in 
others—in their faces, voices, and postures.‖67 Professor Reilly‘s 
general case for emotional intelligence is important, because 
empathy—feeling what another is feeling—is most helpful if a 
person is able to name the feeling and then make some sense of it 
(fold it into his own analysis of the situation and also, in some cases, 
communicate that feeling and understanding back to the person with 
whom he is empathizing). Thus, the competencies Professor Reilly 
wishes to promote are precursors to the empathy on which I focus 
here; we must increase people‘s ability to notice and label what they 
are feeling before we can expect them to share ―fellow feeling‖ with 
others. 
Negotiation and Mediation theorists subscribing to the cognitive 
view of empathy have clear ideas about how such empathy might be 
modeled and nurtured between disputing parties. Mnookin and his 
co-authors, closely aligned with Friedman and Himmelstein, 
advocate ―looping‖ to build empathy and understanding. This 
cognitive empathy can begin even before the parties are face to face. 
As Mnookin and his co-authors advise: ―As you prepare [for a 
negotiation], if you can‘t imagine how the situation makes sense from 
[the other side‘s] point of view, that means you still need to acquire 
more information from him.‖68 Once the parties are in conversation, 
the key to building understanding is the ―empathy loop,‖ which 
Mnookin and his co-authors describe in three steps: ―(1) You inquire 
about a subject or issue[;] (2) The other side responds[;] (3) You 
demonstrate your understanding of the response and test or check that 
understanding with the other person.‖69 Friedman and Himmelstein 
formulate the mediator‘s loop of understanding in four slightly 
different steps: ―1. Understand each party[;] 2. Express that 
 
 66. Id. (citing David R. Caruso et al., Emotional Intelligence and Emotional Leadership, 
in MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES AND LEADERSHIP 55 (Ronald E. Riggio et al. eds., 2002)). 
 67. Id. at 310 (emphasis omitted) (citing as an example the sort of lie detection training 
Paul Ekman says is already available); see PAUL EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING 
FACES AND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL LIFE 15 (2003).  
 68. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 58.  
 69. Id. at 63. 
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understanding[;] 3. Seek confirmation from the parties that they feel 
understood by the mediator[;] 4. Receive that confirmation.‖70  
Bush and Folger give the mediator some responsibility for 
nurturing the parties‘ perspective taking, which can lead to empathy 
and recognition. To do this, they say, mediators ―reinterpret, 
translate, and reframe parties‘ statements—not to shape issues or 
solutions but to help make each party more intelligible to the other.‖71 
But the mediators‘ work is not done at this point. Mediators then ―ask 
parties to consider the significance of such reformulations, pointing 
out opportunities for recognition without forcing them.‖72 In this way, 
even as mediators are helping the parties to form shared 
understandings at the cognitive level, they are also fostering 
emotional connections: ―Instead of dropping relational issues, 
mediators mine them for recognition opportunities.‖73  
Indeed, Bush and Folger describe something close to the 
Mnookinian ―empathy loop‖ when they describe the way mediators 
create ―openings, by asking the parties to talk about events or views 
of the other and then drawing on these statements to help explain one 
party to the other in a new way.‖74 As the mediator also ―listens for 
and invites each party‘s expressions of their own motives and 
sensitivities,‖ the mediator notes the way such expressions ―call for 
response and recognition from the other.‖75 The mediator then ―helps 
each to hear and respond to what the other is saying about how they 
want to be understood.‖76 The loop of understanding serves a 
teaching function; as the parties observe the mediator listening and 
gaining understanding about them as well as their opponents, the 
parties may begin to see how they, too, can understand the other‘s 
perspective.
77
 
 
 70. FRIEDMAN & HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 40, at 68. 
 71. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 52, at 101. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 52, at 196  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. See FRIEDMAN & HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 40, at 109–13 (explaining how ―the 
mediator‘s understanding of the parties‖ can lead to ―helping the parties to understand each 
other‖). 
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On the affective side, ways of nurturing empathy may be more 
varied and slightly less systematic. Most fundamentally, Sandy and 
Cochran describe the genesis of empathy in early childhood. Young 
children learn empathy, they argue, through ―explicit modeling by 
adults‖ (―adults behaving in ways they desire children to imitate‖) 
and ―induction‖ (―parents and teachers giving explanations that 
appeal to the child‘s pride, desire to be grown up, and concern for 
others‖).78 One might ask whether lawyers representing clients and/or 
mediators intervening in disputes apply analogous measures to foster 
empathy and pro-social behavior in disputing parties. Sandy and 
Cochran note that as children develop, so does their capacity for 
perspective taking, and this in turn gives role playing and pretend 
play a greater potential for practicing the skills and modes of thought 
that help children in dispute resolution.
79
  
As we move into adulthood, Deutsch observes that empathy ―is 
most readily aroused for people with whom we identify, with those 
we recognize as people who are like ourselves and belong to our 
moral community.‖80 Conversely, ―[e]mpathy is inhibited by 
excluding the other from one‘s moral community, by dehumanizing 
him, and by making him into an enemy or a devil.‖81 Deutsch says 
that in order to do justice in conflict resolution, participants to a 
conflict must grant ―full recognition of one another‘s equal moral 
status.‖82 To train people in such ―constructive‖ conflict resolution, 
we should undertake, among other tasks, ―to enlarge the scope of the 
student‘s moral community so that he perceives that all people are 
entitled to care and justice [and] increase the empathic capacity of the 
student so that he can sense and experience in some measure the 
injustice that the victims of injustice experience.‖83 
 
 78. Sandra V. Sandy & Kathleen M. Cochran, The Development of Conflict Resolution 
Skills in Children: Preschool to Adolescence, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
supra note 35, at 316, 325–26. 
 79. Id. at 335–36 (―Unlike young children, who have trouble getting outside their own 
identities, middle-years children can engage easily and independently in role plays, which 
require them to separate their own thoughts and actions from those of the characters they 
play.‖). 
 80. Deutsch, supra note 46, at 57–58. 
 81. Id. at 58. 
 82. Id. at 55. 
 83. Id. 
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To achieve the first of these goals, enlarging the scope of the 
student‘s ―moral community,‖ Deutsch suggests an exercise in role 
reversal: 
A good place to start is to help students become aware of their 
own social identities: national, racial, ethnic, religious, class, 
occupational, gender, sexual, age, community, and social 
circle. Explore what characteristics they attribute to being 
American, or white, or Catholic, or female, and so on, and 
what they attribute to other, contrasting identities such as being 
Russian or black. Help them recognize which of these 
identities claim an implicit moral superiority and greater 
privilege in contrast to other people who have contrasting 
identities. Have them reverse roles, to assume an identity that 
is frequently viewed as morally inferior and less entitled to 
customary rights and privileges. Then act out, subtly but 
realistically, how they are treated by those who are now 
assuming the ―morally superior and privileged‖ identity.84 
Such exercises, Deutsch argues, raise students‘ awareness of 
―implicit assumptions about their own identity as well as other 
relevant contrasting identities, [making students] more sensitive to 
the psychological effects of considering others to have identities that 
are morally inferior and less privileged.‖85 Deutsch suggests 
―intergroup simulations‖ in which students develop and then discuss 
―prejudice, stereotypes, and hostility toward members of other 
competing groups‖ despite their awareness that group assignment is 
random.
86
 
In tandem with exercises that mark lines of difference and explore 
the way prejudice and hierarchy can form along them, Deutsch 
suggests role playing to increase empathy: ―Role playing, role 
exchanging or role reversal,
87
 and guided imagination
88
 are three 
 
 84. Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 58 (―Role exchange or role reversal is similar to role playing, except that it 
involves reversing or exchanging roles with the person with whom you are interacting in a 
particular situation (as during conflict).‖). 
 88. Id. (―In guided imagination, you help the student take on the role of the other by 
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interrelated methods commonly employed in training people to 
become empathically responsive to others.‖89 As Deutsch sees it, role 
playing involves ―imagining that you are someone else, seeing the 
world through his eyes, wanting what he wants, feeling the emotions 
he feels, and behaving as he would behave in a particular situation or 
in reaction to someone else‘s behavior.‖90 We shall return to 
Deutsch‘s view of role playing below and see the way that values-
based role plays create enhanced opportunities for this kind of 
imaginative work. 
Closely related to imagination is curiosity, and Chris Guthrie
91
 has 
noted the importance of curiosity in stimulating ―exploratory 
behavior.‖92 Mnookin and his coauthors argue that empathy ―requires 
genuine curiosity‖ and ―cannot be easily faked with the insincere use 
of catch-phrases.‖93 To foster students‘ curiosity, Guthrie suggests 
that teachers implement strategies that inject a sense of challenge and 
purpose into role play exercises. Teachers can challenge students to 
―identify concrete listening or understanding goals prior to 
participating in negotiation simulations or listening exercises,‖ such 
as ―understand[ing] the other side‘s perspective fully before she 
shares her own‖ or ―identify[ing] every interest motivating the other 
side.‖94 When teachers debrief, Guthrie suggests, they should focus 
not only on substantive outcomes but also on information gathering 
to assess ―the listening goals students set and their efforts to meet 
those goals.‖95 To increase students‘ sense of purpose, Guthrie 
suggests, ―[N]egotiation teachers should instruct students to identify, 
ideally in writing, the purposes they think listening carefully will 
serve.‖96 
 
stimulating the student to imagine and adopt various relevant characteristics (not caricatures) of 
the role or person that is being enacted, such as how he walks, talks, eats, fantasizes, dresses, 
and wakes up in the morning.‖). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 58. 
 91. Guthrie, supra note 41, at 63. 
 92. Id. at 65 (defining curiosity as ―a desire to know, to see, or to experience that 
motivates exploratory behaviour‖ (quoting Jordan A. Litman, Curiosity and the Pleasures of 
Learning: Wanting and Liking New Information, 19 COGNITION & EMOTION 793, 793 (2005))). 
 93. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 64. 
 94. Guthrie, supra note 41, at 67. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 67–68 (such purposes could include getting a ―better deal‖ or eliciting 
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IV. ROLE PLAYS: ―THE QUICK AND THE DEAD‖ 
In his plea for greater attention to emotional intelligence in legal 
education, Peter Reilly argues for greater use of simulation and role 
play as the chief vehicle for ―active involvement, or experience, 
whereby the concepts and principles of emotional intelligence can be 
transformed from theory to practice.‖97 In theory, empathy should be 
one such ―principle of emotional intelligence‖ that could be practiced 
in role plays. Yet, when we consider the vast array of traditional, 
existing negotiation role plays, we find much greater emphasis on 
cognitive empathy than affective empathy.
98
 
Much of the debate about the value of role plays in negotiation 
pedagogy focuses on the effectiveness with which they convey 
substantive knowledge or specific skills.
99
 In recent years, I have had 
a growing hunch that some of the most valuable lessons from 
negotiation role plays are not necessarily the ones described in the 
discussion leader‘s guide as the theoretic or skill-based focus of the 
exercise. ―Alpha-Beta Robotics,‖100 for example, is designed to teach 
students about the influence of culture on negotiation. In Alpha-Beta, 
students are assigned and confidentially instructed to apply 
negotiation styles that map many stereotypes about eastern or western 
 
information that might facilitate the creation of joint gains).  
 97. Reilly, supra note 3, at 305. 
 98. See app. 2 (an annotated bibliography of some popular negotiation role plays). 
 99. See Art Hinshaw & Roselle L. Wissler, How Do We Know That Mediation Training 
Works?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2005, at 21 (examining the effects of mediation training on 
mediator performance and proposing ways to study the question further); Nadja Alexander & 
Michelle LeBaron, Death of the Role Play, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING, supra 
note 29, at 179; Noam Ebner & Kimberlee K. Kovach, Simulations 2.0: The Resurrection, in 
VENTURING BEYOND THE CLASSROOM 245 (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe 
De Palo eds., 2010) (offering a spirited response to Alexander & LeBaron, including the insight 
that ―[a]ny experiential method employed to fill the gap left in the instructional toolbox due to 
the critique on role-play needs to be subjected to the same examination that cleared this 
space‖); Paul Kirgis, Hard Bargaining in the Classroom: Realistic Simulated Negotiations and 
Student Values, 28 NEGOTIATION J. (forthcoming 2012); see also Anne Scully-Hill, Paul Lam 
& Helen Yu, Beyond Role Playing: Using Drama in Legal Education, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 
150 (2010) (―Reading relevant plays and observing dramatic presentations of lawyers . . . 
[s]tudents can learn empathy and the ability to see the social or human implications of their 
work.‖).  
 100. This role play was created by Professor Thomas Gladwin, University of Michigan 
School of Business, and appears in RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY & STRATEGY, 
TEACHERS MANUAL AND SIMULATION MATERIALS 275 (2002).  
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approaches to negotiation. However, the instructions do not use the 
terms ―eastern‖ or ―western.‖ Instead, the negotiation styles are 
described as ―Alphan‖ or ―Betan,‖ using descriptive phrases such as: 
―show emotion easily, exuberantly and rapidly‖ and ―confident and 
optimistic,‖ on the one hand and ―behave patiently,‖ and ―emphasize 
reserve and modesty‖ on the other. Students are supposed to observe 
the way these styles affect the parties‘ communication and ability to 
reach an agreement in a cross-cultural deal-making negotiation. 
Unfortunately, a stereotypical east/west dichotomy is often salient for 
students performing this exercise—so salient, in fact, that students 
will read a geographic & cultural subtext in the instructions. For 
example, one group of my students assigned to the formal, passive, 
and patient style greeted their counterparts by bowing. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the cultural stereotypes originate in the 
students (and possibly the instructor) rather than the role play 
instructions per se, students seem reluctant to draw many lessons 
about cross-cultural negotiations from instructions that so 
transparently resonate with cultural stereotypes. 
I continue to use the exercise, however, for a different reason: as 
Alpha-Beta provides students an opportunity to play a personality, 
style, or culture very different from their own, it causes them to 
rethink their ordinary negotiation style. After Alpha-Beta, they 
reexamine their assumptions about power, passivity, and proactivity. 
In some measure, their empathy for contrasting negotiation styles 
may be increased. 
When teaching Alpha-Beta, I sometimes ―cast‖ students against 
type in the passive or aggressive roles, assigning brash and assertive 
students to the patient, indirect style and putting more reticent 
students into the aggressive style.
101
 Responsive papers to this 
―casting‖ can be quite insightful. For example, an assertive male 
student, assigned to negotiate in a passive, patient style, wrote: 
I think I am who I am. If that means I fall into peoples‘ 
stereotypes then it is what it is. What I thought was most 
 
 101. It helps to teach this exercise later in the semester, after I‘ve had a chance not only to 
observe students in role plays and debriefing, but also to read their written responses to their 
role play experiences. 
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interesting about the past Alpha /Beta exercise was that I was 
forced not to be the aggressive person. I liked it. I really got to 
see a method that could really work for me. I think you … 
stereotyped us[,] then forced us not to act according to our 
stereotype in that last exercise? If that was not your intention 
that is the way it seemed from my perspective. I am not mad 
about it[;] I really did enjoy it. I was able to not follow my 
stereotyping.
102
  
A cooperative female, assigned to the aggressive style, found it 
surprisingly easy to adapt to her role (and, interestingly, applied an 
additional lens of gender to the experience): 
In our [negotiation] class . . . I have not directly experienced 
gender bias. However, in the beginning of the Alpha/Beta 
game, I had to force myself to be assertive (more ―male‖). As 
the exercise played out, though, and I began to feel provoked, I 
found myself behaving differently. Our ―Eastern‖ opponents 
repeated ―we don‘t think that‘s fair‖ and ―that would be 
difficult.‖ The frustration caused by their indefinite responses 
and refusal to say what would be fair or to present a solution of 
their own made playing my assigned competitive, aggressive 
role easier. I doubt that anyone would have complimented me 
on acting like a lovely, little lady.
103
 
Part of what occurs is that the Alpha-Beta role play allows students to 
step out of their own skins, if only briefly. In debriefing discussions, 
students have remarked that the exercise allowed them to tap into 
feelings and styles that had not previously seemed accessible. It also 
gave them insights into the ways other negotiators may have seen 
their ordinary negotiation and communication styles (whether 
assertive or passive, competitive or cooperative) in prior negotiation 
role plays. This perspective taking by explicitly leaving their usual 
position and taking up that of other negotiators proved valuable for 
the balance of the semester. 
 
 102. Student Response Paper (Mar. 23, 2009) (on file with author). 
 103. Student Response Paper (Mar. 23, 2009) (on file with author) (Interestingly, this 
student attributes both gender and cultural identities to the two contrasting negotiation styles). 
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Casting students against type runs counter to advice from some 
negotiation trainers. For example, Nadja Alexander and Michelle 
LeBaron assert, in a reconstructed conversation about negotiation 
pedagogy, ―I never ask participants to assume a role that is not their 
own.‖104 Alexander and LeBaron warn that for some students, ―taking 
on others‘ identities may be perceived as disrespectful and 
nonsensical.‖105 The imaginative aspect of role playing that I find so 
valuable, these authors find problematic: ―it literally takes people ‗out 
of their skins‘ into a synthetic situation that may have little relevance 
to their lives.‖106  
Alexander and LeBaron present a valuable critique of role plays. 
Clearly, if participants take their roles ―too far‖ so that they are 
playing a caricature rather than the living, breathing person they have 
imagined, even the lesson in empathy is degraded.
107
 If the role play 
is written poorly or superficially, so that the character seems 
―contrived,‖ it will be difficult for many participants to ―experience 
much connection‖ to their roles or to ―play them authentically.‖108 I 
agree with Alexander and LeBaron that we should ―[d]esign role 
plays that are as close to real life as possible, drawing on composites 
of actual scenarios or real issues so that the simulation has an air of 
authenticity.‖109 The value-based role plays described below follow 
just this strategy. They are based on research I conducted using 
pleadings, court opinions, press materials, blogs by the parties, and 
even interviews with disputants and their lawyers to heighten the 
 
 104. Alexander & LeBaron, supra note 99, at 181. Is it ironic (or is it just me) that a plea 
for real-world-based negotiation training entitled ―Death of the Role Play‖ begins with a 
reconstructed dialogue? 
 105. Id. at 182. 
 106. Id. at 183. Alexander and LeBaron see a potential benefit in ―participants becoming at 
least a little more familiar with their inner terrains.‖ Id. at 182. They recognize some benefit in 
the ―spice,‖ and stimulation that role plays lend. Id. at 184. But with grave doubts about the 
extent to which role plays enhance ―concept learning, analytical skills and real life skills 
transfer,‖ the authors see more value in role plays as entertainment than pedagogy. Id. at 185–
86.  
 107. Id. at 186. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 192–93; see also Noam Ebner & Yair Efron, Using Tomorrow’s Headlines for 
Today’s Training: Creating Pseudo-Reality in Conflict Resolution Simulation-Games, 21 
NEGOTIATION J. 377 (2005). 
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multi-dimensional aspects of the characters involved.
110
 I do not 
believe (nor do I think the authors suggest) that such ―actual 
scenarios‖ must always be similar to situations participants deal with 
in the wider world.
111
  
I also agree with Alexander and LeBaron that we should guard 
against stereotyping in writing and performing role plays.
112
 But I 
disagree with their assertion that students should never be assigned to 
play ―ethno-cultural identities different from their own.‖113 Students 
can feel a deep resonance with a character who exists outside the 
student‘s lived experience.114 Alexander and LeBaron acknowledge 
the opportunities in perspective taking that role plays can provide.  
But Alexander and LeBaron‘s rationale for improvisation rather 
than strict adherence to a script—itself a perfectly legitimate 
guideline for role-playing—betrays, again, some distrust of 
simulations that draw students too far from their own authentic core. 
They advise that teachers should ―[e]ncourage improvisation . . . so 
that participants draw on their own experience and behave as they 
would themselves, given the context . . . [to] enhance the realism of 
the experience.‖115 Even Noam Ebner and Kimberly Kovach, 
defending role plays against Alexander & LeBaron‘s critique, agree 
that ―simulations can be much more realistic if the participants are 
instructed to ‗be themselves‘ and act and react as if the situation 
described actually happened to them.‖116  
In Part V, I explain why role plays that draw students out of 
―themselves‖ and into a character quite different from themselves can 
increase empathy.  
 
 110. See Brown, supra note 13, at 755. 
 111. Alexander & LeBaron, supra note 99, at 186. 
 112. Id. at 193. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Sometimes role playing outside personal experience can be valuable. Alexander and 
LeBaron suggest that teachers of negotiation should ―[t]ake advantage of roles that participants 
may know through interaction, but not from inside another‘s moccasins.‖ Id. at 194 (e.g., police 
officers playing unemployed youth or managers playing line workers). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Ebner & Kovach, supra note 99, at 259. 
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V. ROLE-PLAYING IN VALUES-BASED DISPUTES 
Precisely because they touch upon deeply held values, opinions, 
beliefs and traditions, values-based disputes can challenge students in 
ways we do not generally find in many standard role plays. Tort, 
contract, real estate and even family law based fact patterns may 
permit students to mold the characters to their own personalities, 
values, and styles. Even if at some level students believe that the 
characters they are playing have behaved wrongly or foolishly, they 
nonetheless can assume that most other aspects of the character are 
consistent with their own values, emotions, or viewpoints. 
Values-based role plays are less conducive to such mirroring for 
most students. Because the central conflict may be about education, 
sexuality, religion, public protest, or parenting, and because one or 
more of the characters holds a firm and very deep conviction about 
the specific issue, the characters are less likely to be molded into the 
normal range of law student history or experience. I have argued that 
in the ―real world,‖ these values-based disputes are ripe for 
mediation.
117
 Here, I want to extend this thesis to educational 
contexts and posit that for many of the same reasons that these 
disputes are appropriate for mediation, they are also good teaching 
and training tools for students of Negotiation. As a mediator might 
work with the parties to process the apparent clash of identities and 
values in the cases, so too a teacher can work with students to explore 
and experience emotions, opinions, or perspectives and values in role 
that the students would not necessarily share in their ordinary lives.  
Let‘s recall Morton Deutsch‘s description of role plays, 
particularly as they relate to exercises that combat prejudice and work 
to enlarge a student‘s moral universe. Deutsch suggests that through 
role playing, a student can imagine that he or she ―[is] someone else, 
seeing the world through his eyes, wanting what he wants, feeling the 
emotions he feels, and behaving as he would behave in a particular 
situation or in reaction to someone else‘s behavior.‖118 But Deutsch 
also noted the value of role reversal as a pedagogical tool for 
 
 117. See generally Brown, supra note 13 (arguing that mediation may be optimal for 
resolving certain ―paradigmatic‖ cases that pit gay rights against religious liberty). 
 118. Deutsch, supra note 46, at 58. 
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increasing empathy and enlarging a student‘s ―moral universe.‖119 
Role plays of values-based disputes combine these elements. They 
require some (not all) students to imagine that they are someone else 
and see the world through his eyes. Because so much public 
discourse around these values-based disputes is extremely 
polarized—the student may have a chance to take this imaginative 
journey into the mind and heart of someone who exists ―on the other 
side‖ in the real world. This sort of character is much more foreign—
more dramatically ―other‖—for the student who must play him. The 
student must more fully surrender his own values system and, at least 
for the hour or two that the role play continues, adopt the values of 
his character. 
This practice is valuable, for as Lawrence Susskind and his 
students have argued, ―even in disputes not worth calling ‗values-
based,‘ values and identity are often present in the sense that the 
parties‘ interests often connect to deeper values or identities that are 
never articulated.‖120 They view role plays as opportunities for 
mediators to guide disputants in dialogue that increases 
―understanding . . . without asking them to change what they 
believe.‖ Susskind and his co-authors note that such dialogue can 
pursue ―cognitive‖ understanding ―in which a party is better able to 
see and describe the other person‘s point of view,‖ and a second, 
more ―empathic‖ understanding that ―leads parties to a greater sense 
of trust and decreased level of defensiveness.‖121 Susskind and his co-
authors advocate for this second, empathic understanding as a goal in 
mediating values based disputes—and I agree. They say: ―The point 
is not to transform the parties‘ identities or values, but rather for the 
parties to engage with each other‘s beliefs.‖122 
Just as mediating such disputes ―puts a human face on previously 
faceless enemies,‖123 so too portraying a character can help a student 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Susskind et al., supra note 14, at 4. 
 121. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 13, at 801–02. 
 122. Susskind et al., supra note 14, at 8. 
 123. Id. (―After participating in the humanizing experience of listening to others‘ voices 
and expressions of their concerns, it is often difficult to view those people simply as 
monsters.‖) (citing JOHN FORESTER, DEALING WITH DIFFERENCES: DRAMAS OF MEDIATING 
PUBLIC DISPUTES (2009)).  
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see and feel the essential humanity in a person who might previously 
have seemed odd at best and an enemy at worst. This can be true no 
matter how deeply the conversation in negotiation delves into 
underlying values.
124
 Simply by portraying a character whose 
positions differ from the student‘s own, and by articulating the 
character‘s reasons with as much conviction as the student can 
muster, the process of humanizing can occur.  
The thesis of this Essay is that role playing in highly charged 
values-based disputes is a good way for students of negotiation to 
build their capacity for empathy and perspective taking. The greatest 
benefit comes to students who are assigned to play the role of a party 
whose beliefs are quite different from the student‘s own. When a 
student assumes the role of a person whose beliefs and values clash 
with her own, that student must surrender her own identity in some 
small way, must suspend her own self advocacy to advocate for the 
beliefs and values of the character she has been assigned to play. As 
she assimilates the general and confidential information of her 
character, the student begins to imagine what it might be like to think 
and feel as the character does. In order to play the role at all, the 
student must take the character‘s perspective.  
This characteristic helps to address one of the chief problems with 
perspective taking—that is, that despite our innate abilities to 
empathize, we are often not very accurate in our intuitions about the 
thoughts and feelings of others.
125
 Nicholas Epley and Eugene Caruso 
have identified the triple-A barriers that ―keep people from using 
their perspective-taking ability to its full potential:‖ activation, 
adjustment for egocentric bias, and accessing accurate information. 
Epley and Caruso support their thesis with a review of experimental 
studies focusing on various failures in research subjects‘ perspective 
taking.  
 
 124. See id. at 14 (―[F]ocus on letting students realize that not everyone holds the same 
values, and that not all stake holders will be willing to talk about their values. Playing one of 
the three games at multiple tables highlights these differences, since students will start with the 
same information but will presumably have different experiences, depending on how they 
interpret their roles.‖). 
 125. Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Perspective Taking: Misstepping Into Others’ 
Shoes, in HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 295, 296 (Keith Markman, 
William Klein & Julie Suhr eds., 2008). 
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Epley and Caruso‘s analysis ably demonstrates the complexity of 
these barriers, and role plays are not a panacea. However, the values-
based role plays possess characteristics that may address each of the 
barriers Epley and Caruso identify. First, as professors distribute 
roles, they can activate students‘ perspective taking, urging students 
to prepare for the negotiation by imagining how the situation looks 
and feels from the perspective of the characters they are assigned to 
play. Second, as the values-based role plays supply students with a 
rich description of each character‘s emotional response to the 
conflict, students are better able to adjust for egocentric bias; 
although the students may begin with an egocentric default (focusing 
on the question, ―how would I respond to this situation?‖),126 the role 
play facts may challenge that default. In addition, if teachers 
distribute the instructions and confidential facts a few days before the 
negotiation is to be performed, students have sufficient time to adjust 
away from the egocentric inferences they are likely to draw under 
time pressure.
127
 Finally, well-drawn facts in the values-based role 
plays can put some restraints on people‘s tendency to over-adjust 
from egocentric bias when taking the perspective of ―others who are 
centrally defined by their dissimilarity to the self.‖128 By creating a 
multidimensional character who is driven by multiple interests and 
values—not just the religious values or identity at issue in the 
dispute—the role plays may help students avoid the tendency to 
―overestimate the extent to which the beliefs of opposing groups 
differ from their own.‖129 The third barrier to perspective taking, 
accessing accurate information about another, can cause perspective 
takers to ―rely on stored knowledge about the target under 
consideration . . . [including] stereotypes.‖130 This barrier may also be 
eased when a student is provided general and confidential facts that 
modify the more readily available information on which a student 
would otherwise rely: information about himself or herself, on the 
one hand (that egocentric bias again), or at the other extreme, mere 
 
 126. Id. at 300–01. 
 127. Id. at 301. 
 128. See id. at 302. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 303. 
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stereotypes about a given group (e.g., ―fundamentalist Christians‖ or 
―gay people‖). Thus, although Epley and Caruso review a wide 
variety of experimental results suggesting that perspective taking 
often fails or goes astray, the values-based role plays are designed in 
ways that give students better opportunities to practice this skill than 
they will often encounter, either in real-world conflicts or in standard 
negotiation role plays.  
Notwithstanding the challenges, students are surprisingly good at 
getting into and staying in role. Peter Reilly notes that role plays can 
elicit strong emotions in students, sometimes to their great surprise, 
even when the students are called upon to play characters very 
different from themselves. He cites as an example the simulation 
entitled ―Charlene Walker,‖ in which students must play a low-
income mother of three who works at night as an exotic dancer:  
This negotiation, then, almost invariably intensifies quickly, 
with body language, emotion, and behaviors that frequently 
transition from play acting to ―real life,‖ including anguish-
filled facial expressions, vocal expressions of anger and 
exasperation, and even outright yelling.
131
 
In the values-based role plays, students also report that they were able 
to adopt their characters‘ beliefs with surprising ease, and once in 
role, found it jarring to return to the real world: 
Emotions can be running high when the simulation comes to a 
close, only to have participants—some of whom were 
emotionally committed to their roles and others who may have 
taken on a role contrary to their personal beliefs—scatter and 
be forced to deal with their feelings and reactions on their own. 
I would vote for debriefs, even short debriefs, to be a 
mandatory part of each simulation, so that everyone can both 
come down off the emotional stimulation of the case and better 
process their opinions about the experience.
132
 
A student in the Outfest mediation strongly identified with the anti-
gay protestor party s/he played: ―No one at the table seemed to truly 
 
 131. Reilly, supra note 3, at 305. 
 132. Susskind et al., supra note 14, at 16. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Practicing Empathy 219 
 
 
hear what my interests were. This led me to feel that the City favored 
the OutFest organizers, particularly [when the other participants] 
pushed potential ―solutions‖ that to me clearly failed to meet needs 
that I had already articulated multiple times.‖133 
Similarly, a student of mine who played the Father in Williams v. 
Northville had this to say about his experience: 
I think what most strikes me now is the fact that I found it so 
easy to get into character, despite being in such strong 
disagreement with the views I was expressing. I think I was 
well aware throughout the entire role play of the repugnance 
(or so I saw it) of the position I held and of the things I was 
saying, but I was somehow able to block that out for the sake 
of winning
134
 a favorable result for my side . . . fighting 
zealously for a position that did not reflect my own personal 
opinion, and that was in fact quite opposed to it.
135
 
Sometimes, in order to humanize a character students find very 
different from themselves, they search for a deeper, more 
fundamental point of commonality with the character. The student I 
quoted at the beginning of this Essay, who played the mother in 
Williams v. Northville, eloquently expressed her efforts to find a 
deeper point of connection with her character; she identified this as a 
―desire for parenting autonomy, and . . . belief that she should be free 
to raise her kids according to her own values.‖  
A student‘s own competitive instincts may come into play to spur 
her adoption of the character‘s interests. For example, the student 
quoted above, who played the father in Williams v. Northville, 
compared his own competitive nature to that of the character: 
Of course, it is possible that my intransigence may also have 
been the result of the nature of the character I was asked to 
represent, who, as I recall, was actually supposed to be 
 
 133. Id. at 18. 
 134. My student insightfully connected this experience to the role of lawyers in dispute 
resolution processes: ―In this way, even though the exercise was a mediation, it may also shed 
much light on other forms of ADR, such as arbitration or negotiation, where lawyers play an 
active role.‖ Email from Student/‖Mr. Williams‖ to Jennifer Gerarda Brown (Nov. 19, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
 135. Id. 
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intransigent in real life. But what is interesting is that from my 
vantage point now, it‘s hard for me to separate out how much 
of the way I behaved in the role play had to do with being in 
character, and how much had to do with my competitive-
lawyer instincts being given the chance to express themselves 
in a role that was well-suited to those instincts . . . . Related to 
this, I also can't help but recall the [Thomas-Kilmann Conflict 
Mode Instrument]. I remember being surprised that I scored on 
the über-competitive extreme of the spectrum. I don‘t see 
myself as a competitive person, and I think most people around 
me don't see me this way either. But perhaps the truth is that 
I‘ve simply learned to manage those competitive instincts in 
most situations (or a more unsettling possibility: perhaps I‘ve 
learned to appear reasonable and non-competitive to myself 
and others while not actually being so) and I only let my true 
colors show when it is socially acceptable, e.g. in role plays 
involving inflexible characters. How much did my personality 
have to do with the way I played the role? Interesting question, 
though I suppose I‘m not the most objectively situated person 
to answer it.
136
 
It seems possible that this student, like the student who played his 
spouse, was plumbing his identity for elements of commonality with 
the character he was called upon to play. While the student playing 
the mother found some imaginative overlap with her character in ―a 
desire for autonomy,‖ the student playing the father found it in a 
competitive streak he imagined he might share with the character.  
What interests me is that, as different from their characters‘ as 
both students felt their own substantive values to be, they both felt 
comfortable and fully committed to the role once the mediation 
began. And each found a way to empathize with a radically different 
character by first finding some dimension, some value or 
characteristic—even if somewhat abstract—on which they could 
experience a common ground with the character. 
To create the potential for such experiences, teachers of 
negotiation need not take extraordinary measures. If the role plays 
 
 136. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Practicing Empathy 221 
 
 
come after a few weeks in the course and the enrollment is small 
enough, a teacher will already have some sense of the students in the 
class, their general approach to negotiation, and perhaps also some of 
their values. This knowledge will allow the teacher to assign some 
students to characters with world views different from those the 
students have expressed. I present the role plays for what they are: 
negotiations or mediation of values-based disputes; I do not 
emphasize empathy when instructing the students. I do encourage 
students to be careful and thoughtful when playing their characters, to 
avoid stereotyping and to read the materials thoroughly so that they 
can gain a better sense of what might be driving the character‘s 
interests and values in the dispute.  
Similarly, when debriefing, the points about empathy are easy to 
elicit in the context of discussions about the parties‘ interests and 
values. As part of that discussion, it is easy to pull the focus 
momentarily away from the characters‘ emotional states to ask the 
students what their own thoughts and feelings were as they 
encountered the characters they would play, how their impressions 
evolved as they prepared for the role play, and how their feelings 
continued to change and sometimes intensify once they found 
themselves at the table playing their roles. 
This, as it turns out, may be excellent practice for the real world. 
Experiences like this provide significant exercise, however brief, of 
the student‘s ―empathy‖ muscles. Just as physical fitness regimes 
build strength and endurance under somewhat artificial conditions, 
readying the athlete to lift heavy objects or run distances in ―real 
world‖ situations,137 so too practicing empathy in values-based 
negotiation exercise may build in students a capacity for many of the 
key elements of empathy: perspective taking, curiosity, imagination, 
and compassion. 
In this way, the values-based role plays differ from standard role 
plays. Often, those simulations focus on skills. The payoff of values-
based exercises, in contrast, may be less about something students do 
 
 137. Consider yoga: no one in the real world finds opportunities to assume a ―half moon‖ 
or ―eagle‖ pose in the ordinary course of the day, but people do trip on sidewalks and need 
balance, which is practiced in such poses so that it begins to kick in automatically (when you 
fall off the sidewalk).  
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or skills they acquire, and more about something the students become 
when they are in role. To adopt this alien character and values system 
students must shuffle and even displace their own perspective and 
values.  
Values-based negotiation role plays may do this more effectively 
than standard (commercial, tort, real estate) role plays. In those 
contexts, it is easy for students to imagine the character they play as 
being, at core, similar to themselves. In role, the students essentially 
play themselves in the context of a new challenge or legal 
circumstance. Rarely do general or confidential facts of standard 
negotiation role plays go deep enough to displace a student‘s own 
identity. If we are to credit the analyses of scholars like Ebner, 
Kovach, Alexander, and LeBaron (and I think we should), this may 
be by design. When the chief lesson of a role play is skill acquisition, 
allowing students to ―be themselves‖ while negotiating will better 
train their focus on the matter at hand, such as setting a valid 
reservation price, generating creative options for resolution, or 
discerning the interests of the negotiation counterpart. 
When the point of the exercise is building a student‘s capacity for 
empathy, on the other hand, changing character may be beneficial, 
and standard negotiation role plays provide few opportunities for 
such work. Occasionally, it is true, a character may be divorced, gay, 
disabled, or financially troubled in ways that may feel quite alien to a 
student assigned to play the role.
138
 Such exercises are valuable for 
challenging the student to imagine how it might feel to be gay, 
divorced, or disabled, etc., and to see the ways that might affect the 
party‘s interests and goals in the negotiation. Still, the student can 
remain safely within the realm of her own psyche—her emotional, 
spiritual, or social background and composition can be transplanted 
into the mind and heart of the character whose sexual orientation, 
marital status, or financial condition differs from her own.  
 
 138. I heard a great story from the Houston Mediation Competition in November, 2011, 
where a big, burly man played the role of a young woman, a former beauty queen sickened by 
an erroneous prescription following plastic surgery. With great sincerity and passion he 
repeated several times during the mediation, ―a girl has a right to feel pretty,‖ and everyone 
stayed entirely in role. Email from Carolyn Kaas to Jennifer Gerarda Brown (Nov. 12, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
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When, in contrast, the character‘s ―deeper‖ interests and goals—
her understanding of God, religion, scripture, and people‘s 
relationship to God and each other—are very different from the 
student‘s, something more challenging arises. The student must set 
aside her own worldview to make room for a character‘s 
understanding of the universe and the meaning of life. When a 
student undertakes the role of someone dramatically different from 
herself, she engages in empathy—both cognitive and affective—
simply by playing the role. She hears herself speaking for the 
character, articulating that person‘s ―information and perspective,‖139 
and sometimes, to her own great surprise, she experiences emotional 
reactions (anger, resentment, gratitude, or pain) triggered by her 
imaginative entry into that character‘s inner world. These are the 
seeds of empathy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It has been said that ―you don‘t make peace with a friend; you 
make peace with an enemy.‖140 Although people who repeat this may 
use the words ―friend‖ and ―enemy‖ in a literal way (think Middle 
East or South Africa), this aphorism may hold some truth in smaller 
scale and far less violent contexts as well. In conflict, when beliefs, 
memories, values, and goals are seemingly inconsistent, our 
counterparts may appear to us foreign indeed, an inscrutable and 
confusing source of irritation, thwarting our desires and denying our 
needs. They may even become the ―enemy‖ in the microcosm of our 
interpersonal or institutional conflicts. To resolve such conflicts, we 
must ―make peace‖ with this ―enemy.‖  
To train law students to be peacemakers, we should raise their 
emotional intelligence, and an important part of that goal is 
enhancing their capacity for empathy—cognitive and affective. This 
Essay discussed one tool in this larger project. Values-based 
negotiation role plays, because they create characters with deeply 
held convictions, provide opportunities for students to experience 
 
 139. See Johnson, Johnson & Tjosvold, supra note 36, at 72. 
 140. This truism has been uttered by a large and varied group of people, from Hillary 
Clinton to Moshe Dayan to Mac Maharaj. 
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conflict from the perspective of a person dramatically different from 
themselves. This ―other‖—someone the student might even identify 
at first blush as a sort of ―enemy‖—can be drawn in a sufficiently 
multi-dimensional way to inspire the student‘s imagination. By 
imaginatively entering the world of the character, and then following 
through in words and actions, speaking for the character and 
responding to behavior of other participants in the conflict, the 
student can follow a fuller arc of empathetic understanding. Set aside 
any other teaching goal—forget about whether the case settles, the 
reservation price is exceeded, or creative options are generated. If 
nurturing the minds and hearts of our negotiation students is a task 
we are willing to undertake, then we might devote some time to this 
kind of imaginative travel in foreign, even ―enemy‖ territory.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
OVERVIEW OF VALUES-BASED ROLE PLAYS 
This overview simply quotes the description of each role play 
found in the PON teacher‘s package.141 
Ellis v. MacroB 
This is a five-person, non-scorable simulation focused on 
mediating values-based legal disputes; specifically, disputes 
involving potentially conflicting values and interests around 
issues of homosexuality and religious faith. This simulation 
focuses on a dispute between an employee and his/her 
employer, a large, privately-held software company. It also 
explores the role of attorneys representing their clients in 
negotiated agreements around values-based disputes. In this 
simulation, until recently Ellis was senior project manager at 
MacroB, a computer software company headquartered in 
California. The simulation begins after a dispute arose between 
Ellis and MacroB after the launch of a company-wide diversity 
campaign that featured a series of diversity posters, including 
one that read: ―I am a gay man and I am MacroB.‖ The posters 
were placed in employee work areas, including one located on 
the exterior wall of Ellis‘s cubicle. Ellis is devoutly religious in 
a faith tradition that holds that homosexuality is sinful and 
wrong, and Ellis was deeply disturbed by the poster. In 
response, Ellis posted several Bible scripture verses on the 
inside wall of his/her cubicle that included quotations that 
condemned homosexuality and predicted dire outcomes for 
those who engaged in homosexual acts. When asked to remove 
them by management, Ellis refused. The issue was elevated to 
the company‘s Diversity Manager, P. Geer. After several 
meetings with Geer, Ellis offered to remove the passages if 
MacroB removed its posters depicting homosexual employees. 
After several meetings and no agreement, Ellis was given a 
 
 141. Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, http://www.pon.org/catalog/product_ 
info.php?products_id=468 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
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week off with pay to reconsider, and MacroB removed the 
Bible verses that Ellis posted. Upon returning to work, Ellis 
reposted all of the Bible passages and refused to remove them. 
During multiple meetings, the conversation between Ellis and 
Geer deteriorated, and when it became clear that Ellis would 
not remove the passages, Ellis was fired for insubordination. 
At the urging of a mutual legal professional, Ellis and MacroB 
have reluctantly agreed to speak with a mediator. After hearing 
from both parties, the mediator, Cheney, believes that some 
consensual resolution might be possible. The simulation begins 
at the point where Ellis, Geer, and their attorneys have 
convened with the mediator, Cheney.  
Williams v. Northville 
This is a five-person, non-scorable negotiation simulation 
focused on mediating values-based legal disputes, specifically 
disputes involving potentially conflicting interests around 
issues of homosexuality and religious faith. This simulation 
focuses on a dispute between a public school and parents over 
classroom discussions and materials depicting same-sex 
couples and their families. It also explores the role of attorneys 
representing their clients in negotiated agreements around 
values-based disputes. In Williams vs. Northville, Jim and Jan 
Williams are the parents of two elementary school children in 
the Northville Public School System. A dispute arose between 
the Williamses and the school system about materials in the 
school‘s diversity curriculum that presented homosexual 
relationships and families headed by same-sex couples. J. 
Williams asked the school principal, S. Smith, for advance 
notification anytime homosexuality, same-sex marriage, or 
families headed by same-sex couples would be raised in class, 
and that the Williams children be excused from class during 
these discussions. Principal Smith denied Williams‘ request, 
explaining that no parental notification was required to discuss 
homosexual families in class in this way. The Williamses filed 
a lawsuit against the school district in state court asserting a 
parental right to have their sons excused from the parts of the 
curriculum that were contrary to their religious beliefs. The 
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judge in the state trial court resolved the legal question raised 
by the Williamses in favor of the school district, holding that 
parents do not have the right to restrict what a public school 
may teach their children. This simulation begins at the point 
where the Williamses have filed an appeal of the lower court‘s 
decision. Prior to oral argument in the case, the administrator 
of the appellate court mediation program has urged the parties 
to attempt to mediate the dispute. 
Springfield Outfest 
This is a six-person, non-scorable negotiation simulation 
focused on mediating values-based legal disputes, specifically 
disputes involving conflicting views and values regarding 
homosexuality and religious faith. This simulation focuses on a 
dispute between two private organizations and a city over 
speech rights that will or won‘t be granted as part of a permit 
for a festival on city property. It also explores the role of 
attorneys representing their clients in negotiated agreements 
around values-based disputes. In Springfield OutFest, 
Springfield Pride is a local advocacy organization that supports 
the city of Springfield‘s sizeable lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) community. Springfield Pride‘s largest 
event of the year, by far, is the OutFest, an annual street 
festival permitted by the city of Springfield to celebrate 
National Coming Out Day, to and support and affirm LGBT 
identity. In addition to drawing large, supportive crowds, the 
festival also attracts members of the public who oppose the 
message of the festival and LGBT lifestyles in general. One 
group in particular, Salvation Now!, is a nationwide network 
of grassroots religious and social campaigners who seek to 
bring their religious message directly to those they consider to 
be living sinful lifestyles. The local Salvation Now! organizers 
have been a regular and increasingly visible presence at the 
OutFest over the past several years, including last year. 
Salvation Now! members arrived at the OutFest, megaphones 
at the ready, and began broadcasting a message that many at 
the festival found offensive and hateful. Springfield Pride had 
organized a human buffer of numerous volunteers, who were 
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prepared to shield the crowd from the protesters. The 
volunteers carried massive signs to block the signs of the 
protesters and blew whistles to drown out their megaphones. 
As tensions mounted, the police arrested several Salvation 
Now! members for refusing to follow police instructions and 
disrupting the peace. Although these criminal charges were 
eventually dropped, the confrontation dampened the festival 
atmosphere and attracted quite a bit of unfavorable media 
attention to the city of Springfield and the OutFest. The 
simulation begins one year later. Springfield Pride has just 
submitted its permit application for this year‘s upcoming 
OutFest. Fearing either an escalation of last year‘s 
confrontation or legal liability and court challenges, the city 
has requested a meeting with all parties to try to agree on some 
parameters and rules before this year‘s festival. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
A BRIEF AND ARBITRARILY SELECTIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
OF TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATION ROLE PLAYS EXPLORING 
―EMPATHY‖ 
Eazy‘s Garage 
An exercise exploring the tension between empathy and 
assertion. Can be played with two participants (lawyers only) 
or four (two lawyer/client pairs). Does involve long term 
relationship so more emotional empathy work to do, possibly, 
when clients are there but not much when just the lawyers. 
Energy Assistance 
PON site says Version II of this game, in contrast to Monroe 
Energy Assistance Game I, ―forces the parties to deal with 
fundamental disagreements over values. The parties have to 
find some way of dealing with their ideological differences, 
not just differing economic interests.‖ But this game is 
constructed as a series of transcripts from earlier hearings, 
which the participants are supposed to discuss. I‘m not entirely 
clear on whether they are also meant to play, in role, the 
characters they are assigned who are experiencing this values 
clash.  
Camilia Pictures 
Although the PON Clearinghouse site lists one of the issues 
raised by this exercise as ―the tension between empathy and 
assertiveness,‖ it is clearly using these terms in the 
Mnookinian sense, since the Camilia pictures negotiation in 
conducted by lawyers for the parties. The ―empathy‖ 
experienced and expressed here is therefore likely to be more 
of the ―understanding‖ variety, a cognitive rather than 
emotional process.  
DONS Negotiation 
Another PON simulation designed to raise issues of ethics and 
principal/agent tensions. Students assigned to play characters 
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with secrets to hide and questionable behavior in their pasts 
may find it difficult to empathize with their characters. 
Commonwealth v. McGorty 
A plea bargain negotiation between two prosecutors, a public 
defender, and an alleged rapist designed to raise 
principal/agent issues. As the PON website states, ―It should 
be noted that this case involves highly sensitive issues and that 
one-quarter of the participants are asked to assume the role of 
an alleged rapist . . . . [This] often makes for a provocative and 
memorable learning experience. At the same time, some 
participants may find the scenario upsetting. The Teaching 
Note contains suggestions for how to handle the emotional 
sensitivity of this case.‖ 
Author! Author! 
A dispute between three would-be screenwriters claiming 
credit for a movie script to which they all believe they made 
substantial contributions. Negotiators have wildly divergent 
views of the facts; they do not share common understandings 
about who should be involved (in the script development or the 
negotiation). Confusion about who is coming to the negotiation 
and the reason for their presence often jumpstarts emotional 
reactions. 
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